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 WELFARE IMPACTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE SEED INDUSTRY
Abstract
The paper examines the welfare impact of different intellectual property right (IPR) regimes in
private sector seed research. The model takes into account the period after expiration of IPR
protection, and requires a simultaneous equilibrium in the markets for R&D, seeds, and final
product (grain). Simulation results show that with the exception of R&D productivity, the
optimal level of IPR protection is remarkably insensitive to parameters of the model. There is a
range of IPR appropriability levels where the interests of consumers and producers (taken
together) are complementary to the interests of R&D firms, and another range of appropriability
levels where the welfare of producers and consumers can be increased only at the expense of the
welfare R&D firms. These results may explain some of the acrimony in the debate about plant
gene patenting and genetic use-restriction technologies (GURTs). Results suggest that the
optimum IPR appropriability level is greater than that which exists in the North American seed
corn market, but lower than would exist if GURTs were to become widely used. The optimal
appropriability level is much higher than that which is achieved in situations where crops are
open pollinated or where IPR protection is limited, and this may help explain and justify the
relevance of public research in these situations.WELFARE IMPACTS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE SEED INDUSTRY
I. Introduction
The ongoing debate concerning the patenting of plant genes and biotechnological advances
motivates our interest in a model that links the protection of property rights in the private seed
industry with welfare changes for producers, consumers and the research and development
(R&D) sector. Private sector research will occur only if there is a reward system in place to
encourage this research.
1 The reward system may allow R&D firms to capture all of the benefits
associated with the technological advance and may lead to large deadweight losses associated
with imperfectly competitive behavior.
2 The tradeoff among producers, consumers and the R&D
sector has been encountered and debated for the development of medical drugs and for
technology in the economic literature, but this literature has not yet been applied to the particular
case of agricultural seeds.
The agricultural seeds market tends to be unique in that, unlike the medical sector where
the customer usually consumes the benefits of the newly developed technology directly, the seed
customer is a farmer who sells the resulting crop from the newly developed technology into a
competitive market. The farmer further has the option of saving seed from the unimproved
hybrid/variety, or possibly the newly developed technology from crops grown in previous years
and utilizing the saved seed in the production of subsequent crops.
3 Yield improvements brought
about by R&D encourage the farmer to utilize the newly developed hybrid/variety, but may or
may not improve the overall welfare of these customer farmers in aggregate if the R&D firm is
1We ignore public sector R&D throughout this paper because we do not have measures of the relative efficiency
with which resources are used for research in the public and private sectors. Therefore, our results implicitly assume
that private sector R&D is done in addition to public sector R&D. Pardey and Beintema provide an excellent review
of both recent and long-term trends in agricultural R&D.
2The private sector does fund or conduct research whereby the benefits flow directly to the public sector and are not
captured in this study. Examples would be public research conducted at universities specifically funded by private
foundations where the results are turned over to the public domain or where the results of private research are turned
over to the public as in the case of Golden Rice.
3Farmers have historically have used saved seed in variety crops such as wheat and rice. However, currently in the
seed markets worldwide farmers tend to not use farmer-saved seed and purchase certified seed from cooperatives,
governmental sources, and private companies for both varieties and hybrids.2
able to capture the greater amount of the benefits. This impact needs to be factored in to
measure the welfare impact for society.
Recent related work in this area includes Moschini and Lapan, Alston and Venner, and
Tongeren and Eaton. Moschini and Lapan examine the welfare impact of a particular seed
innovation, but their model does not extend backwards to motivate the incentive structure that
generated this innovation, nor do they take into account the welfare impacts that occur after the
intellectual property right (IPR) protection period or the uncertainties associated with R&D.
Alston and Venner and Tongeren and Eaton incorporate the incentive structure for the R&D
firms, but they do not incorporate the market for the crop. Hence, they cannot examine issues
related to the welfare of those who produce and consume the crop.
The purpose of this paper is to develop and implement a model that allows us to examine
the welfare impact of different IPR regimes on both producers and consumers and on society.
Our model is based on Dixit, and Srinivasan and Thirtle. The model structure requires a
simultaneous equilibrium in three markets. The seed industry must in equilibrium conduct an
amount of research that can be justified by the expected earnings from that research, and each
R&D industry participant must respond to incentives and to competition from other seed
companies in an optimal way. The market for seeds must also be in equilibrium and the farmers
who purchase the improved seed should do so only if the premium charged for the seed is less
than the additional profits they can expect. Finally, the market for the final product (grain) must
be in equilibrium, and changes in costs and farm productivity must eventually impact market
prices.
Once these equilibrium conditions are satisfied, we can parameterize the model and
simulate the impact of changes in the strength of the IPR regime. Seed industry participants
make R&D decisions based on the perceived premium that they could expect for the improved
hybrid/variety. This means that optimal research expenditures will change in response to
changes in the R&D firms' ability to capture these benefits. In turn, changes in R&D
expenditures will affect the likelihood that an improved variety or hybrid will emerge. If the3
seed company charges an optimal premium for these improvements, some farmers will choose to
adopt and utilize the improved variety or hybrid in the production of their crop. Crop output and
market prices will therefore respond in a predictable way and welfare changes can be measured.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first attempt to incorporate the literature on R&D policy to the unique structure that exists in the
agricultural seed industry. We capture the somewhat complex interactions among the three
sectors into a simulation model that has relatively few parameters. In addition, we provide a set
of simulation results that shows an optimal level of IPR protection, and we show that this
optimal level is remarkably robust with respect to alternative parameterizations. A final
innovation is that we take into account the impact of the improved hybrid/variety on welfare in
the period after the expiration of the IPR protection. This latter attribute is important because the
simulation model we propose can be used to measure welfare impacts that might occur if time-
limited legal protections offered to the seed industry are replaced with genetic use-restriction
technologies (GURTs) which have potentially infinite protection periods.
4
II. A Model of Investment in Agricultural R&D
The objective of the present section is to introduce the model used to assess the impact of the
existing IPR regime on agricultural R&D investment. The strength of the IPR regime is
embedded in a parameter µ ≡ µ IPR + µ cost ≥ 0, which measures the degree to which the developer
of an improved farm input can appropriate the benefits associated with the innovation. For
example, µ would measure the appropriability of the benefits associated with new seed traits if
the innovator were a seed company. The level of µ determines the degree of market power that
the developer of the improved input can exercise when selling it to farmers. Parameter µ IPR ≥ 0
is assumed to be increasing with the extent up to which the developer is granted IPRs on the
innovation, and with the level of enforcement of such IPRs. Appropriability µ also increases
4This technology, commonly referred to as the "terminator gene," allows the seed company to insert a gene that
prevents a particular seed from germinating. Farmers who purchase improved varieties containing this technology
would not be able to use the improved technology in subsequent years without purchasing new seed each year.4
with parameter µ cost ≥ 0, which reflects the costs of transferring or copying the output-enhancing
innovation.
Figure 1 depicts the timing of the events involved in the R&D investment decision as
modeled here. At time 0, R&D firms invest resources to compete in a race to develop x1,am o r e
productive version of an existing farm input (e.g., seed) x0. A successful outcome (x1)o ft h e
development process is random and the R&D competition ends at time t, when x1 is first
obtained. The first developer of x1 is granted IPR protection for T periods, so the successful
innovator enjoys appropriability level µ IPR + µ cost over the period [t, t + T]. During this period of
IPR protection, the improved farm input x1 is sold at price w1 = min(
m w1 , µ IPR + µ cost + c1). This
price is equal to the monopoly price (
m w1 ) if the innovator's appropriability level is high enough.
Otherwise, the innovator will charge a markup of µ IPR + µ cost over its marginal cost of producing
x1 (c1). Once the IPR protection expires at time t + T, µ IPR is reduced to zero so that the
innovator's appropriability level decreases to µ cost. This further restricts the innovator's ability to
charge the monopoly price, as the price of the improved input is given by w1 = min(
m w1 , µ cost +
c1) after time t + T.
The previous discussion highlights the need to address the various components affecting
the R&D investment decision at time 0. Such components include the derived demand for the
improved farm input x1 --which in turn involves the end-demand for farm output, the monopoly
pricing decision
m w1 , the nature of the R&D process, and the determination of equilibrium in the
R&D market at time 0. Each of these components is the object of the following subsections.
II.1. Farm Production
The derived demand for the improved farm input x1 depends on the type of technological
improvement that x1 represents with respect to the existing input x0. Given limited space, rather
than addressing all possible types of innovations, the following analysis will focus on the case
where x1 is a Hicks-neutral improvement in x0, a variable input used by farmers to produce some5
Figure 1. Timing framework for the R&D analysis.
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5 More specifically, let z be a vector of other variable inputs, and f(x0, z)a n dg(x1, z)
denote the production functions under x0 and x1, respectively. Then, the R&D improvement is
represented by g(x, z)=( α +1) f(x, z), with improvement factor α > 0 and function f(⋅ ) assumed
to satisfy standard regularity conditions. That is, the type of R&D improvement considered here
is akin to a new hybrid/variety of a crop with yield α % higher than existing hybrids/varieties.
Given prices p, w0, w1,a n dr associated with farm output y and farm inputs x0, x1,a n dz,
respectively, farmers' profit functions dual to the “traditional” and “new” technologies are (2.1)
and (2.2), respectively:
(2.1) π 0(p, w0, r) ≡ [ max , 0 z x pf (x0, z)–w0 x0 – rz ],
(2.2) π 1(p, w1, r) ≡ [ max , 1 z x pg (x1, z)–w1 x1 – rz ].
If farmers can choose either technology, the unrestricted farmers' profit function is (2.3):
(2.3) π (p, w0, w1, r) ≡ max[π 0(p, w0, r), π 1(p, w1, r)].
Profit functions (2.1) through (2.3) are used below to analyze equilibrium in the output and input
markets. Note that farmers are assumed to behave as perfect competitors, so that they do not
take into account the market impact (i.e., on industry production and overall prices) of the
improved input.
6
5A Hicks-neutral improvement seems the type of innovation that best represents seed improvements. However,
other types of R&D innovations can be studied in analogous manner.
6We assume competitive behavior but this may not be the case in some markets. Specifically, farmers may not
behave under perfect competition assumptions in niche or downstream markets where farmers/growers may have
control of the output or end-use product.7
II.2. Equilibrium in the Market for Farm Output
Using Hotelling’s lemma, farm supply y* ≡ y(p, w0, w1, r) may be obtained by taking the partial
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Supply function (2.4) is increasing in p as long as π 0(p, w0, r)a n dπ 1(p, w1, r) are increasing and
convex in p.
Equilibrium in the market for farm output requires output price p to equate the quantity
demanded for the crop with the quantity supplied y*. That is, for given w0, w1,a n dr the
equilibrium output price p* ≡ p(w0, w1, r) satisfies:
(2.5) D(p*) = y(p*, w0, w1, r).
Equilibrium will be unique if the crop demand function D(p) is well-behaved (i.e., strictly
decreasing).
II.3. The Innovation Supplier’s Pricing Decision and Equilibrium in the Input Market
Derived demands for the standard farm input x0*=x0(p, w0, w1, r) and the improved farm input
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Equilibrium in the farm output and input markets depends on the behavior of the producers of the
farm inputs x0 and x1. Market equilibrium for an R&D innovation is affected by whether the
producers of x0 behave as perfect competitors or not (Moschini and Lapan). Further, if producers
of x0 don’t behave as perfect competitors, the equilibrium outcome depends on the type of
strategic game played by the producers of x0 and x1. In the interest of space, attention will be
restricted to scenarios where x0 is supplied by perfectly competitive firms.
7 Also for simplicity,
it will be assumed that x0 is produced at constant marginal cost c0,a n dt h a tx1 is produced by the
IPR holder at constant marginal cost c1. To make the problem interesting, it will also be
assumed that c1 and c0 are such that the improved farm input x1 represents a Pareto improvement
over the standard farm input x0. This requires that the marginal cost of producing x1 not be "too
large" relative to the marginal cost of producing x0.
8
Under perfect competition and constant marginal costs c0, the price of the standard farm
input x0 is w0 = c0. Hence, if the IPR holder behaves as a monopoly, it will set w1 =( 1
m wc 0, c1, r)
to maximize profits. That is:
(2.8)
m w1 ={ max arg w (w – c1) x1[p(c0, w, r), c1, w, r]}.
Embedded in (2.8) is the pricing constraint imposed by the competition from the traditional input
being supplied at price c0. It must be noted, however, that there are realistic circumstances under
which it would be suboptimal for the holder of IPRs to charge w1 =
m w1 . For example, x1 may be
7Analysis of the scenario with less than perfectly competitive suppliers of x0 is more cumbersome, but it can be
performed in an analogous manner.
8The condition that c1 ≤ (α +1 )c0 ensures that x1 is a Pareto improvement over x0, but it is typically much more
restrictive than necessary.9
produced illegally by firms other than the IPR holder, or some firms may be allowed to produce
small quantities of x1 without violating IPRs.
9
For concreteness, suppose that there is a large number of firms that may produce small
amounts of the improved farm input at constant marginal cost (µ cost + c1) ≥ c1. In the instance of
a seed innovation, µ cost would represent the additional costs associated with transferring the trait
without access to the original parent lines. This cost would obviously be greater for hybrid lines
than for open pollinated varieties. Suppose also that if a firm produces the innovated input in
violation of IPRs, it may be caught and found guilty with probability µ Prob ∈ [0, 1], in which case
it is imposed a penalty of µ Pen ≥ 0 per unit produced. The expected profits per unit produced by
such a firm are therefore [w1 –( µ cost + c1)] − µ IPR,w h e r eµ IPR ≡ µ Prob µ Pen.I f t h e r e a r e
sufficiently many potential producers of x1 under these conditions and
m w1 > µ IPR + µ cost + c1,t h e
IPR holder is better off setting w1 = µ IPR + µ cost + c1 to avoid the entry of such potential
competitors.
10
The magnitude of µ IPR ≡ µ Prob µ Pen is directly related to the extent to which IPRs are
being enforced. If IPR violators are rarely prosecuted or convicted, µ Prob will be small.
Alternatively, if convicted IPR violators are subject to small penalties, µ Pen will be small. The
additional marginal cost µ cost reflects the difficulty of producing x1 on a small scale, and need not
be related to the strength of the IPR regime. In summary, the market power of the IPR holder is
constrained by the strength of the existing IPR regime (µ IPR) and by the size of the extra marginal
cost incurred by potential producers of x1 (µ cost). Hence, the improved farm input price w1 =
w1(c0, c1, r, µ ) will be given by:
(2.9) w1 =( [ 1
m w min c0, c1, r), µ + c1],
where µ ≡ µ IPR + µ cost.
9For the case of seeds, an example of the latter situation would be allowing farmers to save seed from an improved
variety for their own usage.
10More precisely, the IPR holder should set w1 an infinitesimally small amount below µ IPR + µ cost + c1.10
In summary, given production costs c0 and c1, and prices of other variable inputs r, (2.8)
yields the monopoly price for input x1. The monopoly price together with the IPR holder's
degree of market power µ and its cost of production c1 determines the actual input price w1 via
(2.9). In turn, w1 determines equilibrium farm output price p from (2.5), total farm output from
(2.4), and the amount of x1 bought by farmers from (2.7).
II.4. A Firm’s Decision to Invest in R&D
The previous subsections address the farm input and farm output markets assuming that x1
already exists. The R&D investment decision is concerned with such markets because they
determine the rents accruing to the firm that first gets the innovation x1.
More specifically, if the improved input x1 is first obtained at time t and the innovator is
granted an effective IPR protection level µ IPR through the next T periods, the innovator's
appropriability levels will be µ = µ IPR + µ cost over the interval (t, t + T)a n dµ = µ cost afterward.
Hence, at time t the present value of the rents extracted by the successful innovator are given by
(2.10):
11
(2.10) v(c0, c1, r, µ IPR, µ cost, T, i)= ∫
+
+ = ⋅ − ⋅
T t
t




= ⋅ − ⋅
T t
cost x c w µ µ | )} ( ] ) ( {[ 1 1 1 exp(− i τ ) dτ ,
(2.10') = i
− 1 [1 − exp(− iT )]
cost IPR x c w µ µ µ + = ⋅ − ⋅ | )} ( ] ) ( {[ 1 1 1
+ i
− 1 exp(− iT )
cost x c w µ µ = ⋅ − ⋅ | )} ( ] ) ( {[ 1 1 1 ,
11Expression (2.10') is derived by setting t = 0 in (2.10). This is not done explicitly in the latter expression to avoid
confusion with the timing of the R&D investment decision, to be discussed later.11
where i is the continuously-compounded interest rate per unit of time and τ is a variable of
integration. The terms {[w1(⋅ )–c1] x1(⋅ )} represent the rents per unit of time accruing to the
innovating firm. The present value of each period's rents is obtained by discounting them at the
appropriate discount rate i by means of exp(− i τ ). Finally, the present value of the discounted
rents over the entire period is obtained by integrating with respect to time. Expression (2.10)
implies that after the initial protected period, only rents associated with µ cost accrue to the
supplier of x1 beyond time t + T (see Figure 1).
R&D firms must decide whether to attempt to develop x1 and obtain the associated IPRs
before x1 exists. Here, Dixit's standard model of R&D competition is used to represent such a
decision. This model postulates that there are many potential R&D firms of different types, the
latter indexed by n over an interval [n, n ] and with cumulative distribution N(n).
12 To
participate in the competition to develop the improved farm input x1,f i r mn must make a lump-
sum R&D investment (e.g., physical capital) kn and then incur a recurrent cost (e.g., labor) ln.
R&D investment kn and recurrent cost ln jointly determine the firm’s hazard rate hn = h(kn, ln; n)
∈ [0, 1), where h(⋅ ) is differentiable, increasing, and concave in (kn, ln), decreasing in n,a n ds u c h
that h(0, 0; n) = 0. The firm’s hazard rate hn is the conditional probability that it will succeed in
developing the improved x1 in the next small unit of time, given that no firm has succeeded so
far. Individual firms' hazard rates are thus functions of the respective lump-sum investments and
recurrent costs, but are independent of the length of time elapsed since the R&D competition
started.
The hazard rate for the R&D industry as a whole (H) is obtained by integrating across the
individual hazard rates:
(2.11) H = ∫
n
n
n hd N (n).
12It is irrelevant whether the distribution of types is discrete or continuous.12
Given that H is the hazard rate for the R&D industry, the probability that no firm has won the
race by time t is exp(− Ht ) (Dixit, footnote 6). Further, if no firm has won the race, the
probability that firm n (who invested kn at the starting time 0) will win the R&D race in the next
infinitesimally small interval (t + dt)i shn dt. Hence, the unconditional probability that such a
firm wins the R&D race over the interval (t, t + dt)i sexp(− Ht ) hn dt, and the present value of
the expected rents associated with such a victory equals v(⋅ ) exp(− it ) exp(− Ht ) hn dt.A s o f
time 0, the present value of the expected rents to firm n from winning the R&D race is the sum





) ( v exp(− i τ ) exp(− H τ ) hn dτ = v(⋅ ) hn/(i + H).
In addition to the lump-sum kn invested at time 0, R&D firm n will incur the recurrent






















i exp ln τ
exp(− H τ 1) Hd τ 1,
(2.13') = ln/(i + H).
The inner integral on the left-hand side of (2.13) represents the present value of the recurrent
costs if the race finished at time τ 1,w h e r e a st h et e r m[ exp(− H τ 1) Hd τ 1] denotes the probability
of such an event. The outer integral accounts for the fact that the race may finish at any time
after the lump-sum investment is made.
With expected returns and expected recurrent costs given by (2.12) and (2.13'),
respectively, the expected profits to firm n from investing the lump-sum kn at time 0 to
participate in the R&D race are:13
(2.14) V(kn, ln, H, n; ⋅ )=v(⋅ ) h(kn, ln; n)/(i + H) − kn − ln/(i + H).
The decision problem for expected-profit-maximizing R&D firm n consists of choosing kn =
) ; (
* ⋅ H kn and ln = ) ; (
* ⋅ H ln so as to maximize V(kn, ln, H, n; ⋅ ), given the industry hazard rate H
(which is taken parametrically by firm n because of the perfect competition assumption).
Optimal values ) ; (
* ⋅ H kn and ) ; (
* ⋅ H ln are obtained from the first-order necessary conditions for
the maximization of (2.14).
II.5. Equilibrium in the R&D Market
Optimal lump-sum investment and recurrent costs for each of the R&D entrants are obtained as
indicated in the preceding subsection. Since each firm takes the industry hazard rate H as given,
equilibrium in the R&D industry requires that the consistency condition (2.11) be met. That is,
industry equilibrium is defined by:
(2.15) H






n n H l H k h ] ); ; ( ), ; ( [
* * dN(n),
where ) ; (
* ⋅
e
n H k and ) ; (
* ⋅
e
n H l are firm n's optimal lump-sum investment and recurrent costs ,
respectively, under the equilibrium industry hazard rate H
e.
Quantification of the equilibrium industry hazard rate H
e is essential to analyze R&D
scenarios under alternative parameterizations, as H
e represents the (equilibrium) probability that
the innovation will occur in the next unit of time. In addition, the quantity 1/H
e is the
(equilibrium) average time that it takes to obtain the innovation. Besides H
e, other variables
related to R&D that are useful to quantify are the equilibrium aggregate lump-sum investment
and recurrent costs, given by (2.16) and (2.17), respectively:
(2.16) K
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µ µ π = ⋅ | ) ( denote farmers' equilibrium profits before the
innovation, after the innovation but under IPR protection, and after expiration of the IPR
protection, respectively (see Figure 1). Then, if the innovation occurred at time τ 1, the change in
producer surplus per unit of time would be zero up to time τ 1,
cost IPR
e
µ µ µ π + = ⋅ | ) ( [ − )] ( 0 ⋅
e π from
time τ 1 until time τ 1 + T,a n d
cost
e
µ µ π = ⋅ | ) ( [ − )] ( 0 ⋅
e π afterward. Discounting such changes up to
time zero and adding them up yields the present value of the change in producer surplus if the
innovation happened at time τ 1, which is the term within curly brackets in (2.18):
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e π .
T h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h eexpected change in producer surplus due to the introduction of the
improved input x1 (∆ PS) is computed as in (2.18) because [exp(− H τ 1) H] is the probability of
the innovation occurring during the interval (τ 1, τ 1 + dτ 1).15
A similar reasoning can be followed to measure the expected change in consumer surplus
due to the innovation (∆ CS). That is, define ) ( 0 ⋅
e p ,
cost IPR
e p µ µ µ + = ⋅ | ) (, a n d
cost
e p µ µ = ⋅ | ) (a s t h e
equilibrium crop prices before the innovation, after the innovation but under IPR protection, and
after expiration of the IPR protection, respectively. Then, if the innovation occurred at time τ 1,



























ζ ζ after time τ 1 + T.
Discounting and adding up such values yields the change in consumer surplus if the innovation
occurred at time τ 1, shown as the term within curly brackets in (2.19):
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Expression (2.19) takes into account the probabilities associated with the innovation taking place
at different times in the future.
Still another welfare measure is the equilibrium aggregate present value of expected
profits for the R&D industry (RDS). This can be computed from (2.20):
(2.20) RDS = ∫ ⋅
n
n
n n n H l k V ) ; , , , (
* * * dN(n).
That is, RDS is calculated by aggregating (2.14) across all R&D firms.16
III. Simulation Specification and Parameterization
To illustrate the implications of the model, crop demand is assumed to be isoelastic:
(3.1) D(p)=Dp
−ε ,
where D > 0 is a scaling parameter and ε > 0 is the constant elasticity of demand for the crop.
The crop production function under the traditional input is postulated to exhibit constant
elasticity of substitution between inputs and decreasing returns to scale (so as to yield an
upward-sloping crop supply):
(3.2) f(x0, z)=F {[
σ / 1
x a
σ σ / ) 1 (
0
− x + z
(σ − 1)/σ ]
σ /(σ − 1)}
η /(1+η ),
where F > 0 is a scaling parameter, σ ≥ 0 is the constant elasticity of substitution between inputs
x0 and z,a n dη > 0 is the constant elasticity of crop supply. Parameter ax > 0 determines the
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profit function associated with (3.2) is:
(3.3) π 0(p, w0, r) ≡ η
η (1 + η )




0 w + r
1− σ )
− η /(1− σ ).
Technology and profits under the improved input (g(x1, z)a n dπ 1(p, w1, r), respectively) are
straightforward to obtain from (3.2) and (3.3) by noting that g(x, z)=( α +1) f(x, z).
The hazard rate function of R&D firm n is represented by a Cobb-Douglas technology
with decreasing returns to scale:




where A(n) is a firm-specific scaling parameter, and κ K >0a n dκ L > 0 are constants such that κ K
+ κ L < 1. The optimal hazard rate associated with (3.4) is:17
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Given (3.5) and (2.15), the equilibrium aggregate hazard rate is obtained by solving
numerically for H
e the implicit equation (3.6):
(3.6) H
e − Å κ
) 1 /( ) ( ) (
L K L K v
κ κ κ κ − − + ⋅
) 1 /( ) (
− + +
L K K e H i
κ κ κ =0 ,
where Å ≡ ∫
− − n
n
L K n A
) 1 /( 1 ) (
κ κ dN(n). The solution to (3.6) must satisfy 0 ≤ H
e ≤ 1 because the
equilibrium hazard rate is a probability. Upon solving for H
e in (3.6), the aggregate equilibrium
lump-sum investment and recurrent costs can be calculated from (3.7) and (3.8), respectively:
(3.7) K
e = Å κ κ K
) 1 /( 1 ) (
L K v
κ κ − − ⋅
) 1 /( ) 1 ( ) (
L K L e H i
κ κ κ − − − + ,
(3.8) L
e = Å κ κ L
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L K v
κ κ − − ⋅
) 1 /( ) (
− + +
L K K e H i
κ κ κ .
Interestingly, the functional form chosen for the hazard rate function (3.4) obviates the
need to specify the scaling function A(n) and the distribution function of R&D firms N(n)t o
solve for the R&D industry equilibrium. As it can be seen from (3.6), (3.7), and (3.8), all of the
R&D industry equilibrium figures only depend on parameter Å, as this parameter summarizes all
of the information required about the functions A(n)a n dN(n).
Despite the apparent complexity of the model, simulations can be performed with as few
as eleven parameters. These are the elasticities of supply (η ), demand (ε ), and input substitution
(σ ), the cost share attributable to traditional seed (determined by ax), the length of time during
which property rights are enforced (T), the interest rate (i), the strength of the IPR regime (µ IPR
and µ cost), the expected improvement in seed productivity (α ), and the productivity of "labor" and18
capital in the R&D process (κ L and κ K). Other parameters of the model can conveniently be
normalized to unity; these are the price of other inputs (r), the cost of producing old seed (c0)a n d
new seed (c1), and the scaling parameters in the demand, output, and hazard rate functions (D, F,
and Å, respectively).
Comprehensive sensitivity analyses of alternative parameterizations were performed. In
the interest of space, only the most realistic and insightful scenarios are reported below. For the
purpose of reporting results, the parameterization chosen for the benchmark scenario was η =
1.5, ε = 0.5, σ = 0.3, cost share = 10%, T = 17 years, i = 10% per year, µ cost =0 ,α = 20%, and κ K
= κ L = 0.3. Simulations were conducted by varying µ IPR -- and therefore appropriability µ -- over
a very large range of feasible values.
IV. Results and Discussion
Figures 2 and 3 show the present value of the expected change in total surplus (i.e., for the farm,
consumer, and R&D sectors) using a range of demand and supply elasticities.
13 Sensitivity
results for different elasticities of substitution (σ ) and expected yield impact (α ) show a very
similar pattern, though with different absolute levels of welfare changes. All of the results in
Figures 2 and 3 show changes in welfare increasing up to a maximum point, and then declining
before flattening out. In all instances, the expected change in welfare is positive regardless of the
level of appropriability, but there is clearly an “optimum” level of appropriability that maximizes
the welfare change. This optimum level is typically in the range between µ =1a n dµ =2 ,
14 and
is surprisingly resilient to changes in model parameters other than the productivity of "labor" and
capital in the R&D process (κ L and κ K). The change in surplus rises with the appropriability
level up to the maximum point as more research increases the rate of yield growth, and it
13The reported surplus changes can be put in perspective by comparing them with the present value of consumer
expenditures if improved seeds were not introduced at all. The latter values range from 6.44 (for ε = 3) through
12.82 (for ε = 0.5) for the scenarios depicted in Figure 2, and from 11.63 (for η = 5) through 13.25 (for η =1 )f o r
the scenarios shown in Figure 3. (Note that total initial surplus cannot be used as a benchmark for comparative
purposes because the isoelastic demand function (3.1) yields an infinite consumer surplus when ε ≤ 1.)
14The expected level of annual yield growth with an appropriability level of µ =1 . 5a n dT =1 7y e a r si sa r o u n d
3.5%.19
Figure 2. Present value of expected change in total surplus as a function of appropriability level (µ ), for


























































Figure 3. Present value of expected change in total surplus as a function of appropriability level (µ ), for



























































declines after this point as deadweight losses associated with the exercise of market power are
introduced. The decline in welfare halts when the price on the improved seed rises to a level
where farmers become indifferent between adopting it and using unimproved hybrids/varieties.
Rather than lose these customers, seed companies optimally charge a lower price for seed than
their monopoly situation would dictate if there were no substitutes. The ability of producers to
chose between hybrids/varieties dramatically limits the ability of the seed company to behave as
a monopolist. For this reason, the seed company never sets marginal cost equal to the marginal
revenue of the demand curve that would exist in the absence of the farmer’s ability to choose the
unimproved hybrid/variety.
The level of the total expected welfare change is sensitive to the parameterization of the
model. When crop demand is inelastic (as might occur if exports are not significant or close
substitutes are not available), farmers lose regardless of the other parameter values. However,
consumer surplus rises as crop demand becomes more inelastic, and the sum of producer and
consumer surplus also rises because consumer gains outweigh producer losses. This can be seen
in Figure 2. Figure 2 also shows that the optimum appropriability level is very insensitive to the
size of the elasticity crop demand and reaches its maximum value at around µ = 1.6. The
sensitivity of the results to changes in the farm supply elasticity (η ) is depicted in Figure 3. This
graph reveals that a smaller farm supply response increases the optimal appropriability level, and
reduces the rate at which welfare is reduced to the right of this point.
Figure 4 shows how results change as we modify the length of the protection period (T).
The optimal appropriability level decreases with the length of the protection period. This makes
sense because R&D companies would need smaller incentives to conduct research if they can
capture benefits for a longer period.
The results for an infinite protection period to the right of an appropriability level of µ =
4.7 are those that would exist if GURTs were used to replace legal protections. These results
suggest that GURTs would result in a small positive impact, but they also show that the optimal
appropriability level is far lower than that which would exist under GURTs (i.e. welfare22
Figure 4. Present value of expected change in total surplus as a function of appropriability level (µ ), for
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T = infinity23
increases as the appropriability level falls below µ = 4.7), and that the welfare impact of reducing
the appropriability level to this optimal point is substantial.
Figure 5 shows the present value of the expected change in total surplus as a function of
both the appropriability level and the protection period. Here the societal tradeoff between the
length of protection and the level of protection becomes very clear. At low levels of
appropriability welfare increases monotically in the protection period, whereas at higher levels of
appropriability there is an optimum protection period of about T = 5 years. The expected change
in total welfare falls when the protection period is greater than T = 5 years because price
premiums last longer, thereby depriving consumers of the benefits associated with the eventual
removal of IPR protection. There is no corresponding increase in R&D at these protection levels
because firms are constrained by producer choice rather than by the level of IPR appropriability.
All of the results presented so far assume that the policy maker values the welfare of
producers, consumers and the R&D firms equally. This assumption contradicts some of the
political economy literature that suggests different welfare weights for different groups (Rausser
and Freebairn). Figure 6 shows some results that incorporate these political economy
considerations. The vertical axis shows only the sum of the present value of expected changes in
consumer and farm surpluses, i.e., it attaches a weight of zero to the R&D firms. The horizontal
axis shows only the present value of the expected change in surplus of the R&D firms. The
graph shows how different levels of appropriability impact on these two welfare measures for a
17-year protection period (the one that is currently in use in the U.S.) and an infinite protection
period.
15 The most interesting result in the 17-year line Figure 6 is that there is a wide range of
appropriability levels (µ ∈ (0, 1.2)) over which the interests of both groups are complementary.
Increased appropriability in this region increases the surplus of the R&D firms and increases the
welfare of the rest of society. The results also suggest that over a different range of
appropriability (µ ∈ (1.2, 4.7)), increases in the welfare of R&D firms comes at the expense of
15The curve is drawn by changing the level of appropriability from µ =0t oµ = ∞ , while leaving all of the other
parameter values constant. In the graph, appropriability increases monotonically from left to right.24
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the rest of society. With a 17-year protection period, policy makers who attached a weight of
zero to the welfare of R&D firms would choose an appropriability level of µ = 1.2 while those
who attach equal weights to all three groups would choose an appropriability level of µ = 1.6.
16
With a 17-year protection period, points associated with µ < 1.2 reduce total welfare and can be
ruled out regardless of the policy makers' relative preference for the two groups. On the other
hand, the only possible justification for µ > 1.6 is a greater weight for the welfare of R&D firms
than for the welfare of consumers and farmers.
With GURT technology we have an infinite protection period, and there is a level of
appropriability of µ = 4.7 at which the sum of consumer and farm surpluses is zero. Although
this level may be considered unrealistically high, it does help explain why the early discussions
regarding this technology were so negative.
The difference between the 17-year line and the infinite time line at the higher levels of
appropriability shows the present value of the welfare benefits that accrue after the protection
period. These can be substantial.
It is possible to change the optimal level of appropriability by adjusting the productivity
of both "labor" and capital in the R&D process (κ L and κ K). As the productivity of these inputs
falls, the optimal level of appropriability also falls. Therefore, we have chosen these values both
to reflect the productivity we have seen in this sector (Huffman and Evenson) and at as small a
level as can be justified by the literature.
IV.1. What is the Appropriability Level in the U.S. Seed Industry?
To assess the simulated results vis-à-vis real-world appropriability levels, it is worth noting that
the magnitude of µ in a particular market can be estimated from the marginal production costs
for seed (excluding R&D expenditures) and the sales price for that seed. For example, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission Form 10 K for Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. for
16The slope of the 17-year curve depicted in Figure 6 equals minus one at µ = 1.6. Hence, at that point the welfare
of one group can be increased by $1 only if the welfare of the other group is reduced by the same amount.27
1998 (p. 90) breaks out costs and margins for North American seed corn operations. The price
per unit sold in 1996 and 1997 respectively was $75.0 and $78.9.
17 The production cost of each
unit sold can be calculated as $52.2 in 1996 and $55.7 in 1997. However, this production cost
included R&D expenditures of $6.2 in 1996 and $7.5 in 1997. Subtracting these R&D
expenditures from production costs provides estimates of marginal production cost of $46.0 in
1996 and $48.2 in 1997. Comparing market prices received with this marginal production cost
suggests a measure of µ  = 0.63 in 1996 and µ  = 0.64 in 1997, given the chosen normalization of
unitary marginal costs (c1 =1 ) .
18 These figures are relevant because Pioneer Hi-Bred
International is by far the largest producer of hybrid seed corn in the U.S., with a market share in
the North American hybrid seed corn market approaching 40%.
We conducted a similar analysis for DeKalb Seed Company and found measures of µ of
0.44 in 1997 and 0.35 in 1998. To compare with firms outside the seed industry, we looked at
available data from leading firms in other industries with heavy emphasis in R&D, such as
computers (Intel Corporation and Microsoft) and pharmaceuticals (Pfizer and Eli Lilly). Intel
had a µ of 1.05 in 1997 and 0.66 in 1998, and by 2002 Intel's µ had fallen to 0.49. Microsoft had
a µ of 1.60 in 1997, 1.88 in 1998, and 1.68 in 2002, with an average µ of 1.94 over the six-year
period from 1997 through 2002. Eli Lilly and Pfizer had appropriability levels that varied
between a low of µ = 0.67 for Pfizer in 1998 and µ = 1.15 for Eli Lilly in 2001. The average for
these two drug companies over the six-year period from 1997 through 2002 was µ = 0.80 for
Pfizer and µ = 0.98 for Eli Lilly. It would be interesting to calculate optimal appropriability
levels using a model that described the industry and market structure that drug and computer
companies operate in. For now, all we can say is that appropriability levels in the U.S. seed corn
industry appear to be lower than those that exist in other sectors where intellectual property
rights are important and protected.
17Each unit consists of 80,000 kernels.
18This calculation implicitly assumes that the limiting pricing factor for w1 in (2.9) is µ + c1.28
An interesting experiment is to ask what level of productivity of labor and capital would
be needed to justify the appropriability level of around µ = 0.6 that we see in the U.S. seed corn
market. To achieve this one needs productivity measures of κ L < 0.15 and κ K < 0.15
simultaneously. These values are unrealistically small (Huffman and Evenson).
The above results suggest that the appropriability level that exists in this sector is
probably lower than the social optimum. Yet the hybrid seed corn market in the U.S. represents
an extreme in terms of appropriability. This is true because hybrid seed lines are difficult to
copy and because U.S. property rights are strong. This comparison suggests that appropriability
levels for other sectors of the seed market where appropriability levels are weak (e.g., open
pollinated crops such as wheat and soybeans in the U.S., and all crops in countries with poor
property right protection) are far lower than the social optimum. So long as this situation is in
place, public research will be essential to offset the lack of sufficient private incentives.
V. Conclusions
This paper proposes and utilizes a model that assumes optimal behavior and equilibrium in the
private sector R&D market, the market for seeds and the market for grains. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first attempt to allow for simultaneous equilibrium in all three of these
markets.
The model allows us to calculate the impact on producer and consumer surplus of
changes in plant variety protection (or intellectual property rights (IPRs)). The model can be
used to measure the impact of R&D during the period for which protection is granted and in the
period after which this protection is removed. Despite the apparent complexity of the model,
relatively few parameters are required for purposes of simulation and most of these can readily
be found in the literature. Results confirm a well-known result that producers generally lose
from innovations whenever the own-price elasticity of crop demand is less that one.
19 However,
19Although on average producer welfare is lost, producers who are early adopters of the new technology tend to gain
from it.29
increased benefits to consumers outweigh producer losses and total welfare increases in IPR
appropriability over a wide range.
We present simulations that show that there is an optimal level of IPR appropriability for
seeds, and that this level is not particularly sensitive to parameters of the model other than the
R&D productivity of the seed industry. We also show that there is a range of appropriability
levels where the interests of consumers and producers (taken together) are complementary to the
interests of R&D firms. There is also a range of appropriability levels where the welfare of
producers and consumers (taken together) can be increased only at the expense of the welfare
R&D firms.
These results may explain some of the acrimony that has accompanied the debate about
the patenting of plant genes and the genetic use-restriction technologies (GURTs). Seed firms
typically view all increases in IPR appropriability as welfare increasing, and our results confirm
that assumption. But those that represent consumers and producers can correctly point out that
there is at the upper range of IPR appropriability over which the welfare of R&D firms comes at
the expense of the rest of society, and that total welfare can sometimes be increased by reducing
the level of IPR appropriability. Our results suggest that the optimum level of IPR
appropriability is greater than that which existed in the North American seed corn market in
1996 and 1997, but that it is lower than would exist if GURTs were to become widely used.30
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